Several major risk studies have been performed in recent years in the maritime transportation domain. These studies have had significant impact on management practices. The first, the Prince William Sound Risk Assessment, was reviewed by the National Research Council and found to be promising but incomplete, as the uncertainty in its results was not assessed. The difficulty in incorporating this uncertainty is the different techniques that need to be used to model risk in a dynamic and data-scarce application area. In this paper, we combine a Bayesian simulation of the occurrence of situations with accident potential and a Bayesian multivariate regression analysis of the relationship between factors describing these situations and expert judgments of accident risk. These techniques are applied to a risk case study involving an assessment of the effects of proposed ferry service expansions in San Francisco Bay. This paper can be considered an innovative application of Bayesian simulation and Bayesian multivariate regression to assess uncertainty in risk analysis of a maritime transportation system.
exposure assessment for ferries in San Francisco Bay (Merrick et al., 2003) are three examples of successful risk studies in this domain, combining system simulation with probabilistic risk assessment techniques. Their results have been used in major investment decisions and have played a significant role in the management of maritime transportation in the US. Figure 1 shows the risk intervention effectiveness estimates from the WSF Risk Assessment. The actual risk intervention cases modeled are described in van Dorp et al. (2001) . The figures shows the total percentage reduction in collision probability for the WSF system for various risk management alternative broken down by the severity of the accidents, classified as Minimum Required Response Times (MRRT): less than one hour, between one and six hours and above six hours. As another example, Figure 2 shows the results from an analysis of proposed ferry service expansions in San Francisco Bay. The estimates show the frequency of interactions between ferries and other vessels for the current ferry system (Base Case) and three alternative expansion scenarios which increase the total number of ferry transits per year.
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Figure 2. An assessment of alternative expansion scenarios for ferries in San
Francisco Bay.
One problem with the representations in Figure 1 and Figure 2 is the apparent finality of the results. The decision-maker is led to believe that the results are definitive and are in no way uncertain. In fact, the National Research Council performed a peer review of the PWS Risk Assessment and concluded that the underlying methodology shows "promise" to serve as a systematic approach for making risk management decisions for marine systems (National Research Council 1998) . However, to speak the truth in maritime risk assessments, the degree of uncertainty needed to be communicated (Kaplan 1997) . "Risk management … should answer whether evidence is sufficient to prove specific risks and benefits" (A. Elmer, President, SeaRiver Maritime, Inc. in National Research Council, 2000) .
In this article, we discuss an innovative application of Bayesian simulation and Bayesian multivariate regression to perform a complete assessment of risk and uncertainty for dynamic systems. These techniques have not been applied previously in a risk assessment setting. The methodology has applications beyond maritime accident risk, such as port security and aviation safety and security. A summary of the article is as follows. Section 2 discusses uncertainty and how it is best represented in risk analysis.
The framework for a full uncertainty analysis of the results of the maritime probabilistic risk assessment models is summarized in Section 3. The results of an uncertainty case study are offered in Section 4, where the robustness of conclusions drawn in a study of ferry expansions in San Francisco Bay are assessed. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
Uncertainty Analysis
The presence of uncertainty in analyzing risk is well recognized and discussed in the literature. However, these uncertainties are often ignored or under-reported in studies of controversial or politically sensitive issues (Pate-Cornell, 1996) . Two types of uncertainty are discussed in the literature, aleatory uncertainty (the randomness of the system itself) and epistemic uncertainty (the lack of knowledge about the system). In a modeling sense, aleatory uncertainty is represented by probability models that give probabilistic risk analysis its name, while epistemic uncertainty is represented by lack of knowledge concerning the parameters of the model (Parry, 1996) . In the same manner that addressing aleatory uncertainty is critical through probabilistic risk analysis, addressing epistemic uncertainty is critical to allow meaningful decision-making. Cooke (1997) offers several examples of the conclusions of an analysis changing when uncertainty is correctly modeled.
While epistemic uncertainty can be addressed through frequentist statistical techniques such as bootstrap or likelihood based methods (Frey and Burmaster, 1999) , the Bayesian paradigm is widely accepted as a method for dealing with both types of uncertainty (Apostolakis, 1978; Mosleh et al., 1988; Hora, 1996; Hofer, 1996; Cooke, 1991) . However, as pointed out by Winkler (1996) , there is no foundational Bayesian argument for the separation of these types of uncertainty. Ferson and Ginzburg (1996) use the terminology variability for aleatory uncertainty and ignorance for epistemic.
Winkler's argument essentially says that variability is purely ignorance of which event will occur.
The distinction of types of uncertainty, however, does have certain uses in the risk assessment process (Anderson et al., 1999) . Specifically, the distinction is useful when explaining model results to decision-makers and the public and when expending resources for data collection. In the communication case, the distinction must be drawn between the statements "we don't know if the event will occur" and "we don't know the probability that the event will occur." In the data collection case, epistemic uncertainty can be reduced by further study and data collection, whereas aleatory uncertainty is irreducible, as it is a property of the system itself (Hora, 1996) . Bayesian modeling can allow for the distinction and handle the underlying differences inherently. Monte Carlo simulation (Vose, 2003) can be used to propagate uncertainty through a model (requiring significant computer power), while Bayesian analytical techniques can be used for analyzing data and expert judgments (Cooke, 1991) .
Modeling Uncertainty in Dynamic Risk Assessment
We will use the examples of ferry risk assessment to demonstrate the application of Bayesian simulation and Bayesian multivariate regression to assessing risk for a dynamic system, such as a maritime transportation system. We shall use the expert judgments from the Washington State Ferries Risk Assessment analyzed using the Bayesian multivariate regression techniques developed in Merrick et al. (2004b) and apply them to the output from the Bayesian simulation of San Francisco Bay ferries described in . While both studies considered ferries, these results should not be taken as a definitive analysis for either application as the experts from WSF were not considering San Francisco Bay when responding to the expert surveys. In each of these studies, one type of accident was considered, specifically collisions between a ferry and another vessel. Collisions occur within a situation defined by factors that affect the probability of occurrence. Table 1 shows the factors that were used to describe the situations in the WSF Risk Assessment.
A Probabilistic Risk Framework
The accident probability model is based on the notion of conditional probability, conditioning on the factors that determine the level of accident potential in a situation. To estimate the probability of a collision, we sum over the possible situations giving Table 1 for 1,..., j k = and k is the total number of possible combinations (2,163,200 in Table 1 ). Thus the accident probability model consists of two parts:
• ( ) j P Situation : the probability that particular combination of values of the factors occurs in the system
: the probability that an accident occurs in the defined situation.
To perform an assessment of the risk of an accident using this model, both terms in the probability model need to be estimated. . The preferred method for estimating these probabilities is through the statistical analysis of accident data. However, expert judgment elicitation is often crucial in performing risk analyses (Cooke, 1991 . We must then propagate these uncertainties though the framework expressed by (1).
Bayesian Simulation of a Maritime Transportation
Bayesian simulation differs from classical simulation analysis in that probability distributions are used to represent the uncertainty about model parameters rather than point estimates and confidence intervals. Such treatment is applied to both random inputs to the model and the outputs from the model. In the language of uncertainty, classical simulation models only aleatory uncertainty, while Bayesian simulation models both the aleatory and epistemic uncertainty. In this section, we discuss the development of a Bayesian simulation of the San Francisco Bay area. A classical simulation was developed by the authors for a study examining the effect of proposed service expansions under consideration by the California legislature (Merrick et al. 2003) . As part of our uncertainty modeling, extended the SF Bay simulation model using Bayesian input and output modeling techniques.
In the existing simulation, the ferry transits were based on fixed schedules for the current ferry system and for each of the alternative expansion plans. Visibility and wind conditions were incorporated by tracing large databases of environmental data obtained from National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) observation stations in the study area. However, the arrivals for non-ferry traffic was based an historical data. Input uncertainty should be incorporated in the analysis to reflect the limited data available to populate the parameters of the arrival processes in a simulation model (Chick 2001) . Thus Bayesian renewal process models of traffic arrivals were created in for all 5,277 arrivals processes.
The presence of input uncertainty means that there will be uncertainty in the outputs as well. This will include aleatory uncertainty as this is a stochastic simulation, but also epistemic uncertainty as the simulation is run for a finite period. In our risk assessment methodology, the data obtained from the simulation in each replication will be the number of vessel interactions occurring in each replication of the simulation, ). However, as we wish to propagate uncertainty throughout the overall model, a probability model will be hypothesized for these output statistics. Chick (1997) notes that this can be thought of as a Bayesian version of metamodeling (Law and Kelton 2001) .
As our output data is in the form of a count, the number of vessel interactions for the j -th combination of values of the factors can be naturally modeled using a Poisson distribution with rate j µ , with a conjugate gamma distributed prior on j µ with shape j α and scale j γ . The posterior distribution of the expected vessel interactions frequency for the j -th combination of values of the factors is given by
The predictive distribution of ( ) j P Situation is then a Poisson-gamma distribution in the sense of Bernado and Smith (2000) . Note that the epistemic uncertainty here can be reduced by running longer simulations, the aleatory uncertainty cannot; this would require additional traffic data. Merrick et al. (2004b) propose a multivariate Bayesian analysis of expert judgments for an extended form of pairwise comparisons (Bradley and Terry, 1952) that accounts for correlations between the experts' responses (Clemen and Reilly, 1999) . The aim of the expert elicitation method, as applied to maritime risk, is to estimate the effect of multiple factors on the probability of a collision, denoted
Bayesian Multivariate Regression for Expert Judgments
. An example of the form of the questions drawn from the WSF risk assessment project is shown in Figure   3 . Note that in each comparison, the situation is completely described in terms of the factors and only one factor is changed between the two situations the expert is asked to compare. The responses to the questions are in terms of relative probabilities of the event in the two situations. Thus, if the expert circles a "1", this means they believe that the two probabilities would be equal, or if the expert circles a "9" on the right (left) then they believe the ratio of the probabilities is 9 (1/9) (Saaty, 1977) .
The form of the underlying probability model is assumed to be
where 0 p is a baseline probability of a collision and β is a vector of factor effect parameters. Due to this choice of form, the ratio of probabilities will be equal to 
where X is a ( ) N q × matrix of differences between the q covariates for N questions, 
To complete the prediction recall that the regression was on the natural logarithm of the experts' assessments of the ratios of probabilities, so the actual predictions of the probability is a log student-t distribution.
Propagating Uncertainties
To perform a full uncertainty analysis of such a maritime risk model, we had to obtain Bayesian predictive distributions for each term in the model, ( ) The total run time will now be one-tenth as long plus a small time for passing data after the simulation runs and the sampling. While this is not the frontier of work on parallel computing, this simple application can make the difference between running all the analysis needed for a complete decision and not.
An Uncertainty Analysis Case Study
In an effort to relieve congestion on freeways, the state of California is proposing to expand ferry operations on San Francisco (SF) Bay by phasing in up to 100 ferries in addition to the 14 currently operating, extending the hours of operation of the ferries, Table 1 and six interaction terms. The prior distributions used in Merrick et al. (2004b) were vague. For the model form in (3), a value of zero for these parameters implies that the corresponding factor does not affect the collision probability. A positive (negative) value indicates that an increase in the factor would increase (decrease) the collision probability. As the factors describing the situations effect the probability of a collision given that a situation occurs, ) | ( j Situation Collision P , the analysis from is useful, but not definitive. Instead we must examine the collision probability itself, ( ) P Collision . Figure 9A shows a similar pattern of increase for the expected yearly number of accidents as seen for the expected yearly situations. However, with the introduction of estimated accident probabilities based on expert judgments, there is significantly more uncertainty evident in these results and this uncertainty cannot be removed by simply running more simulations. The largest uncertainty remains about Alternatives 2 and 1. However, there are almost certainly a higher expected number of accidents in Alternative 1 than Alternative 2. There is not such certainty when comparing the Base Case to Alternative 3.
Whereas there was an almost certain ranking in terms of the expected yearly number of situations, this is not true for the expected yearly number of accidents. As the comparison is not clear on a scale that includes Alternatives 2 and 1, Figures 9B and 9C show the box plots for the Base Case and Alternative 3 respectively; the 90% credibility intervals for the two alternatives are ( It is evident from Table 1 that there will be many possible situations that can be counted in the simulation and from Figure 8 that these situations can have significantly different accident probabilities when they occur. Thus to compare the accident probabilities in the situations occurring in the different alternatives, we take the average accident probability across all situations that occurred in the simulation of each alternative. For each alternative, this involves taking the number of times that a given situation defined by the factors in Table 1 occurs and multiplying by the accident probability given that the situation occurs. We then add these results up for all possible situations and divide by the total number of situations that occurred. Figure 10 shows the results of these calculations and the remaining uncertainty about the results for each alternative. Note that the result in Figure 9 can now be explained. Whereas the expected yearly number of interactions increases from the Base Case to Alternative 3, the average probability of an accident actually decreases, thus causing the distributions of the multiple of these two quantities, the expected yearly number of accidents, to overlap. The average accident probabilities for Alternatives 2 and 1 are about the same as the Base Case, but there is more uncertainty. The analysis can be decomposed by any of the factors in Table 1 . By this we mean that we can examine the expected yearly number of situations or accidents where the first interacting vessel was a navy vessel compared to a product tanker or where there was good visibility versus bad visibility. We can also calculate the average accident probabilities in situations of different types. To explain the decrease in average accident probability from the Base Case to Alternative 3, we broke down the analysis by each of the factors in Table 1 and discovered that, while other smaller effects were contributing to the result, the main effect was a change in the proximities of not the closest interacting vessel, but the second closest interacting vessel. This factor is included in the analysis as multiple nearby vessels are more confusing and thus lead to a higher chance of human error and thus collision. Figure 11B shows the average accident probabilities for the Base Case for a second vessel within 1 mile of the ferry, the second vessel over 1 mile away (but still closer than 15 minutes away) and for no interacting vessel. It is evident that having a second vessel is considerably more risky than not and that the second vessel being closer in is more risky than further away. This is a logical result. While the exact values in Figure 11B are for the Base Case, they do not change significantly in the other alternatives, so these are omitted. Figure 11A shows the percentage of situations in each alternative that occur in these three classifications for the second interacting vessel. Note that in Alternative 3 there are proportionally fewer situations that have a second interacting vessel within 1 mile, the riskier situation, and proportionally more situations where the second interacting vessel is over 1 mile away, the less risky situation. This is a result of the artificial timings of the schedule tested for Alternative 3. As the average accident probability is averaged over all situations occurring in the simulated alternative, this will mean that the average accident probability will be lower for Alternative 3 than the Base Case. What would these results mean in terms of the decision to build out the San Francisco Bay ferries if they could be considered more than an academic demonstration of the techniques? Firstly, while Alternative 3 does significantly increase the number of ferries and thus the expected yearly number of situations from the Base Case, there is a decrease in the risk of the situations that occur and thus the comparison in terms of expected yearly accidents is not conclusive. However, as this result appears to be caused by the artificial nature of the schedule tested, the actual schedule to be implemented should be tested in this manner before any decisive conclusions could be reached. We note that such caution would not be engendered by an analysis without uncertainty as the mean values would have implied a definitive ranking and led to the conclusions that Alternative 3 was less safe. Alternatives 2 and 1 do almost certainly increase the expected yearly number of accidents as ferries are added to the schedule. Merrick et al. (2003) concludes that with such a result, measures to reduce accident probability and control the occurrence of interactions should be considered before implementing such a major build out of the San Francisco Bay ferry system.
As a final remark, alternative comparison maps for the expected yearly number of collisions, like that in Figure 6 for the expected yearly number of situations, would be desirable. They would show where the accidents were most likely to occur and help design effective risk reduction measures. However, as the location would become an extra factor in the analysis with many possible values, this analysis is currently not computationally feasible, even with parallel implementation of the calculations.
Conclusions
We have developed an overarching Bayesian framework for addressing uncertainty when simulation of situations that have accident potential is combined with expert judgment to assess risk and uncertainty in a dynamic system, applying this framework to maritime transportation. The combination of the Bayesian simulation and a Bayesian multivariate regression of expert judgments is an original contribution to the field of uncertainty assessment in risk analysis. In the case study, the results in Merrick et al. (2003) were shown to be robust to the aleatory and epistemic uncertainty inherent in assessing risk in such a dynamic and data-scarce system, though surprising results did occur.
The broader impact of this work is primarily drawn from its applicability to areas other than maritime accident risk. Port security risk (intentional as opposed to accidental events) has now been recognized as an integral part of homeland security. Subsequent uncertainty assessment of security risk and propagation in security intervention effectiveness needs to be accounted for, since lack of data will be of even greater concern than for accident risk. Furthermore, despite our focus on maritime risk, the framework and methodologies developed will be applicable to other transportation modes as well, such as aviation safety including the ever-increasing problem of runway incursions at our national airports (FAA 2003) .
